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EXAMINING THE SCOPE OF INDECENT REPRESENTATION OF
WOMEN (PREVENTION) ACT,

1986,

IN THE LIGHT OF CYBER

VICTIMISATION OF WOMEN IN INDIA

- Debarati Halder
INTRODUCTION

One of the most common forms of online harassment of women is depicting
the victim through false and derogatory identities mostly through social websites
like Facebook and also through adult websites. While in the West, Craigslist
is also used ro expose the personal information, including residential address
of the victim, for tagging her as one who solicits sex,l in India the medium of
victimisation is largely restricted to Facebook and adult websites, including porn
sites. The typical nature of victimisation includes creation of a profile of the
victim, which may contain picture(s)2 and the personal information incl uding
residential addresses, schooling and graduation information and professional
designations. 3 In most cases, such profiles may be left open for public viewing,
and they are constantly updated in the search engines.' Of late, the trend has
broadened to include verbal description of the victim in extremely derogatory
terms, describing her as a 'whore' or 'prostitute' through adult bullying and
trolling in Facebook and Twiner. This has been proved in the recent cases of
Chinmayi 5 where the singer was harassed through online and other bullying
See Franks Mary Anne. Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discriminatio n in Cyberspace

20 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW 224(20 II).
2

Including genuine as well as morphed pictu res of the victim.

3

The observation is derived from the personal experiences of the autho r through her
experience as the managing director for Centre for Cyber Victim Counseling.

4

Ibid.

5

See Vivek Narayan, Cops Clip Twuurs' Wingl for Harassing Singa THE HINDU(OCr. 22,

20 12), http://www.thehindu.com/newslcit ics/chcnnai/cops-cli? -rwcctets-wings- forharassing-singer/anicle4023339 .ece? hom epagc=truc.
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and trolling 6 Ironically the Information Technology Act, 2000 (amended in
2008) offers extremely limited help ro women thus depicted on the intemer.
Prior ro Chinmayi's case, any such portrayal of women on Facebook and other
social media through fake profiles, which I term as "fake avatars," were being
dealt with under section 67 and 67A of the Information Technology Act,
largely'- The thin line of difference between victimising women through foke
avatars and through trolling on lwitter lies in the fact that while in the former
channels, visual images can be attached ro create the foke avatar, in case of
Twitter trolling, mosrIy the sharp abusive and derogarory words do the needful.
Even though visual images can be uploaded in Twitter also, so far the author has
not come across any case where obscene remarks as parr of trolling have been
accompanied by offensive images in Twitter. However, it is anticipated that the
fast acclimatization ofTwitter as a channel ro victimise women through verbal
creation of foke avatars may very soon also include visual images. It can be
noted that prior to the introduction of sections 67 and 67Aof the Information
Technology Act,2000 (amended in 2008) in the IT Act, India had a central law
named Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986 (IRWA)
which became largely overshadowed by these two later provisions which were
meant specifically for digital publication.
The recent decision of the Union cabinet to expand the scope of the IRWA'
to cover the audio-visual media and material in the electronic form raises the
questions of the accountability of sections 67 and 67A of the Inform ation
Technology Act and the government and judicial understanding of the nature
of rIle offence of victimisation of women through creation and depiction of fake
avatars. The IRWA amendment was made specifically with an object to "aid in
addressing the problem ofincreased objecttfication ofwomen and thereby ensuring

6

See Kavitha Rao, The Problems With Policing Sexism on TwitterTH£ ATLANTIC (Nov. 20
2012) http://www.theadamic.com /sexes/a rchivc/ 20 12/ 11Ithe-problcms-with-policingscxism -on-rwinerl265451 /.

7

Some of the cases where such harassments we re reported and these [wo provisio ns were
applied by the police have been di scussed lat er in th is paper.

8

Su,

PRESS I NFORMATION BUREAU , GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, AMENDMENTS IN THE

I NDECENT REpRESENTATION OF WOMEN ( PROHIBITION) ACT,1986,

(2012),

National Law School Journal

Vol. II

2013

dignity of women. " 9 Sections 67 and 67A of the Information Technology Act,
2000 (amended in 2008), are gender neutral. A clear reading of the twO provisions
would show that they address the issue of creation, distribution and production
of obscene and sexually explicit material and the pattern of usage of these two
provisions by the police have also proved that these two provisions are beneficial
towards identifYing/addressingvictimisation of women on the internet. H owever,
the amendment ro the IRWA makes the law more gender specific. Further, the
amendment has made all these three laws at par ro deal with this speci fic kind of
victimisation by increasing the jail term and monetary fine amount to make the
graviry of the offence equal with those prescribed in sections 67 and 67A of the
Information Technology Act, 2000 (amended in 2008) . But al the same time, the
penalizing action of all these provisions remains restricted to either imprisonment
or monetary fine for "whoever" commits the crime.
Th is paper argues that while a gender-specific provision is needed to deal with
victimisation of women through creation offoke avatars, th broadened scope
of the IRWA alone cannot bring justice to the victims. The re is a huge gap in
the socio-legal understanding of victimisation of women through creation of
foke avatars. The present usage of the existing laws under the IT Act that would
be shown through the case srudies below, have almost laid a pathway ro use
the proposed amendments to fulfil only part of the objective of the law, i.e., to
prevent and punish the wrong doer for what these laws rypically prescribe as
'illegal' under the Indian criminal justice system. But on the other hand, the
IRPWA and the existing provisions of the IT Act along with the Ind ian Penal
Code, which are often roped in to make the offence 'gender specific,' have a
high tendency to satisfY the victim with minimum remedy, i.e. , to remove the
offending post. T his paper thus argues that the IRPWA and related laws that
would be discussed in this paper fail to recognise the risk factors for women
victims of such kinds of victimisations in the long haul. If seen from the feminist
rights perspective, the therapeutic approach" of these laws to th e victi ms remains
9

Ibid.

10

Professor Dabid Wexler, the founder of Therapeutic jurisprudenc(; School, explains the
term therapeutic Jurisprudence in the following words: "Therapeutic Jurisprudence focuses
OUf

anemian on

me traditionally uncler.appreciatcd area of the law
190

5

cons iderable impact
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extremely narrow. In light of the above argument, the paper aims ro examine
the scope of the proposed amendments of the IRPWA from the therapeutic
jurisprudence perspective lion the basis of the following questions:
I.

Could the proposed amendments ro the IRPWA prove more beneficial
ro women who have been harassed online through fake avatars?

2.

Where do the laws fail in meting out therapeutic justice to the victims of
online victimisation through fake avatars?

3.

What could be a possible solution in terms of laws beneficial

to

women?

This paper is divided into three segments; the first is dedicated to understanding
patterns of victimisation of women through fake avatars in cyber space. The
second segment speaks about the legal issues and the third part looks to
conclusions and suggestions for future .

MAJOR PATTERNS OF VICTIMISATION OF WOMEN IN THE
SOCIAL MEDIA THROUGH FAKE AVATARS
Victimisation of women through false representation can take place in two
patterns as shown below:

Ci)

Representation made with the help of visual images of the victim: In
this pattern , the targeted media could be Facebook and adult websites.
Here the representation may contain images which portray the victim
in indecent fashion. Such sorts of visual images can be accompanied by
full personal details of the victim to enable viewers to know her more
personally.

me

on emocionallife and psychological wellbeing. Its essential premise is a simple one that
law is a social force that canJroduce rncrapcuric or ami-therapeutic consequences. The
law consists of legal rules, leg procedures and the roles and behaviours oflega! actOrs, like
lawyers and judges. Therape utic jurisprudence proposes that we use the tools borrowed
from the behavioural sciences to study the therapeuric and ami-therapeutic impact of the
law and that we think creatively about improving the therapeutic functioni~g of the law
without violating other important values such as Gault-like due process." UUDGING IN
THERAPEUTIC KEy, THERAPEtITIC jURlSI'RUDENCE AND THE COURTS Bruce]. Winick and
David B. Wexler (cd.) (California Academic Press, Durham North Caroling, 2003) p 7.

11

Wexler further explain ed the concept of therapeuric juri sp rudence by stating "therapeutic
jurisprudence is a perspective that regards the law as a social force that produces behaviours
and consequences." (Wexler D. B., Tluraptutic jurisprudmaand its application 10 criminal
justia research and development 7 IRISH PROBATION JOURNAL (20 I 0)
19 1
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(ii) Representation made with false and offensive verbal description of
the victim: In this pattern, the targeted media could be Twitter, Facebook
groups, etc. The representation may parti cularly target the victim's
professional orientation, political ideology and may describe the victim
in an offensive manner.
The two patterns may be explained through the following five case studies:
Case study no. 1: As per the reports publ ished in the 1Imes of India, on
Oct.9 , 20 12,1 2 the perpetrator had hacked into the email id of the victim ,
gathered information and circulated mails containing obscene contents to
the victim's acquaintances. He also created fake profiles on ,ocial networking
sites which contained abusive and obscene contents. The Hyderabad CIO
cell registered this case under sections 66A (which prescribes punishment
for se nding offensive messages through communication services), 13 660
(which prescribes punishment for cheating by impersonation)I ' and 67 of the
Information Technology Act, 2000 (which prescribes punish ment for publ ishing
or transmitting o bscene material in electronic form).I '
Case study no. 2: As per the reports published in The Telegraph on Sept. 18,
2012,1 6 the perpetrator who was an ex-Indian army man had posted personal
details of the victim and her husband in pornographic si tes, incl udi ng their
residential addresses, and had also crea ted a fake profile of the victim in a
wife-swapping website. The victim's husband lodged an FIR when they started
receiving unwanted phone calls and came to know about the derogarory
messages that were spread through fake email ids by the erpetrato r. Even
12

Suo TNN, Techie Heldfor Harassing Colleague. TIMES OF INDIA (OCL 9, 2012). Available at
http://artic1 cs. timesofindia.indialimcs.com/20 12-10-09 /hydetabad/3434 24 95_ I_cybercrime-obsccne-conten t-software-engineer.

13

T he full {exc of [he provision is availabl e at hnp: llwww. lawzonline.com/bareacts/
information- ccchnol ogy-act/section66A- in formation-techno logy-3ct.hrm. accessed on
27.04.2013,.

14

Ibid.

15

Ibid.

16

Vikash Sharma & Lelin Kumar Mallick, Rromge whiff in (-crime- Man posts cktails of
woman on porn websites. Available @http: //www.telegra phindia.com / I12091 9/j.p/odi. hal
Story_1 5992007.j'p#.UJpRyW_Mg7U. Accessed on 07. 11.2012
192
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though the original complaint was with the Puri police, due to their incapacity
to handle such cases, the case was later transferred to the Cuttack crime
branch. The perpetrator was arrested under sections 66{c) 17 and 67AlB of the
Information Technology Act and Sections 292 {prescribes punishment for sale
etc. of obscene books),' 9 465(which prescribes punishment for forgery)'Oand
469 of the Indian Penal Code {which prescribes punishment for forgery for
purpose of harming the reputation)."
Case study no.3: As published on the NDTV website on Oct.22, 2012,"
Chinmayi, a noted singer from South India, was harassed by perpetrators
who posted threatening and obscene messages on Twitter and Facebook. The
report said that Chinmayi made a formal complaint to the Chennai Police
Commissioner on the grounds that the perpetrators had threatened ro "kill
yape and assault" her on Twitter and Facebook and that her mother was also
being targeted by use of vulgar expressions. The perpetrators did not stop with
making obscene and vulgar comments towards Chinmayi; they also targered
her on the issues of supporting the cause of Tamils. The report stated that on
the basis of her complaint, one of the accused was arrested under the provisions
17

see supra note 13

18

Ibid

19

s. s. 292 of rhe INDIAN PENAL CODE in clause (I) defines obscene book, pamphier ere.
as a book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing. painting, represe ntarion, figure or any orher
object. shall be deemed to be obscene ifit is lascivious or appeals lO the prurient interest
or if its effect, or (where it comprises [wo or more distinct items) the effect of any onc of

its items is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons. who are
likely, having regard to all relevam circumstances, to read, see o r hear the maHer contained
or embodied in it". Full text is available at http://www.advocatekho j.comllibran·/bareacrs/

indianpcnalcodcl292. php'1ide-Indian%20 Penal%20Codc, %20 I 860&STide-Sale. %20
etc., %200P';6200bscenc%20books, %20ctc. Accessed on 27.04.2013
20

Full text of th e provision is available at http: //www.advocatekhoj.comllibraryl
barcactsl i nd ian pc nal codc/4 6 5. Ph P ?Ti tie-l nd i an % 20 PI.' nal %20 Code , % 20 1

860&STide- Punishmem% 20for%20[orgny. Accessed on 27.04.2013
21

Full text of the provision is available at h(tp: /Iwww.advoca tekhoj.com/librar¥1
bareactsl i nd ian pe nalcode/4 69. ph P ?Ti tl e- l n dian %2 0 Pe nal %20Code, % 201
860&STide _Forgery%20for%20purpose%20of%20harm in g%20reputation. Accessed

22

Sam Daniel , Chmnai professor arrrsud for werts about singrr Chinmayi (October. 22 ,
2012) , Published @ http: //www.ndtv.com /aniclc/cities/chennai. profcssor-arrestcd-forrweets-abour-singer-chinmayi.283070 .. Accessed on 07.11 ,2012.

on 27-04-2013
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in the Information Technology Act and Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women
Harassment Act.
Case study no. 4: In the case of Ajit Singh, @Ajeet Singh v. The State of
Jharkhand,21 the court denied the bail petition of the accused on the ground
that he had circulated pictures in which the victim was captured being
raped . Along with sections 355 (which prescribes punishment fo r assault or
criminal force with intent to dishonour person, otherwise than on grave
ptovocation) /376(prescribes punishment for rape)/387(prescribes pu nishment
for putting person in fear of death Ot of grievous hurt in ordet to commit
extortion) /420 (prescribes punishment for cheating and dishonestly inducing
delivery of properry) /499(which defines defamation)/ 120B(which ptesctibes
punishment for ctiminal conspiracy) of the Indian Penal Co e, and Section 67
ofl.T. Act (which prescribes punishment for publishing or transmitting obscene
material in electronic form), the accused was also booked under Section 6 of
the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986."
Case study no. 5: As had been teported in the Times a/India. Chennai edition
on 7'h November, 2012 ,'5 a woman created a Facebook pro file of her femal e
colleague in which she allegedly used the victim's picture. The profile included
information aboUt the victim which porttayed her as a woman "soliciting men
for sex.. " She also created a blog revealing the victim's personal informa tion with
the intent of maligning her. The victim became awate of the misdeed when she
started receiving harassing phone calls from unknown men an the information
about the Facebook profile was made known to her. On i nvesrigation, the

23

Aj it Singh @Ajeet Singhv. State ofJharkhand, B.A. No.239 of20 12 [H igh Co urt of
Jharkhand J..

24

Section 6 of the

I NDECENT REpRESENTATION OF WOMEN (PROHI BITIO N)

ACT, 1986

prescribes for pcnalcy in case of contravening sections 3 and 4 and pI escribes punishmcOl
for imprisonment of either descriprion for a te rm whi ch may extend to cwo years, and
with fine wh ich may extend (0 two thousand rupees , and in the: event of a second or

subsequent conviction with imprisonment for [Cfm of nor less than six momhs bue whi ch
may extend to five years and also w ith a fine

n Ot

less {han {en thousand rupees but whi ch

may extend to o ne lakh rupees. ,.
25

See Tim es News Network, Term~d victim as a ca/lgirl: ttchie creaUJ fake profile ofcolleague,
held. Times ofIndia, Chcnnai edilion, 7'h November, 2012, pg 4
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police found our rhar rhe perpeua[Or woman was angry and frusuated wirh the
vicrim due [0 her growing friendship with a male colleague. The perpetra[Or
was booked under section 507 of the Indian Penal Code, which prescribes
punishment for criminal intimidation by anonymous communications and
section 509 of the Indian Penal code which prescribes punishment for words,
gestures or acts intended [0 harm the modesry of the woman, and section 66A
of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (amended in 2008), which prescribes
punishment for sending offensive, annoying or insulting messages through
..
.
commUnication serVices, etc.

From the above, it can be seen that, while in the first, second and in the fifth
case studies, the pattern of victimisarion may fall in the category of the first
rype as shown above,'6 the pattern of victimisation shown in the founh case
study would show that even though it may also fall under the first category, it
was actually displaying rhe already a victim of rape.
The vicrimisation pattern in the third case study may fall 111 the second
category. 27Such kinds of victimisation may fall in the category of public cyber
bullying or trolling. Jaishankar defines cyber bullying as "abuse/harassment by
teasing or insulting victims' body shape, intellect, family background, dress sense,
mother tongue, place oforigin, attitude, race, caste, class; also, name calling, using
modern telecommunication networks, such as mobile phones (SMS/MMS) and
Internet (Chat rooms, emails, notice boards and groups. 28) As Halder & Jaishankar
point out, such kinds of victimisation of women through bullying may stan
from a uivial disagreement, and this may lead [0 huge online defamarion."
Trolling, on the other hand, differs from bullying in this regard in that the
persons who are uolling may not be directly and personally affected by the

26

See the description of two panerns of v ictimis3rion through false representation above.

27

Ibid

28

See K. Jaishankar.

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY AND JUSTICE AT MANONMAN IAM
A RESEARCH REPORT ON

SUNDERANAR UNIVERSITY, CYBER B U LLYING IN INDIA:

DEVELO PING PROFILE, LEGAL REVIEWS AND POLICY GUIDELINES

29

Debara{i Halder & Jaishankar K.
LAws,

(2008 ).

CYB ER CRIME AND THE VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN:

RIGHTS , AND REGULATIONS, 26-7 (2on)
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speech of the victim. Trolling can be defined as "an extreme usage offeedom of
speech which is exercised to disrupt the community diseursions in sociai lletworking
sites and which is done to deliberately inrult the ideologies StIch as feminism,
secularism, etc., ofthe topic starter or the Stlpporters ofthe topic starter." T he main

aim of the troll is to disrupt the ongoing communication thread wirh extremely
offensive speech which may upset others including the victim. 30"The concept
of 'troll posts' is defined by Herring and others as "provoeatz ve posting intended
to p roduce a large volume offivolous responses. "31 Herring's observations can
be tested with C hinmayi's online victimisation case." Apparently, she was
called names and described in a detogatory fash ion. This created twO groups
comprising of several individuals supporting her and support ing the opponents,
who in rum contributed large number of posts attacking each other's views.
The prominent result was obviously a degenerated porrr:tyal of the victim
due to some provocative posrs. Both bullying and trolling can have huge
potential to victimise women in cyber space, largely because both these rypes
of victimisarion trends use sharp and insulring verbal words to describe the
victim online in a fal se and derogatory manner. Such verbal descriptio ns may
not only stay in the social media due to the nonchalant attirude of the service
provider, they may even Aoar to huge numbers of individuals through search
engi nes due to excessive sharing of the posts and parricipation of individuals
in the posts. This particularly happens when either the victim's profi le, or one
or many of the perpetrator's profiles or the group where the discussion is going
on is open to public viewing and does not have any privacy barrier to bar or
limit the audience.
The above case srudies, therefore, present varied channels through which
derogatory, indecent and false portrayals of women victims can be made . All
these incidents acrually created a different avatar of these women, which portray
them differently from what they are in their real lives . I call these avatars as
30

This was proved in the court findings in the case of Jade Goody Facebook trolling casc. For
further information , see Editor, BBC news Jade Goody Website trollfro m Manchester jailed
BBC(Oct. 29, 2010)htt p://www.bbc.co.uklnews/ uk-england-manchester- 11650593.

31
32

Ibid.
The online vicrimisarion of Chinmayi is discussed in detail in the next segme nt.
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foke avatars, and it can thus be defined as "a folse representation of the victim,
which is created by the perpetrator through digital technology with, or without, the
visual images ofthe victim and which carries verbal information about the victim
which mayor may not be folly true, and it is created and floated in the internet to
intentionally malign the character of the victim and to mislead the viewers about
the victims original identity." As such, it can be seen that in all the case studies
above, the victims' fake avatars were intentionally created in an indecent manner,
if the term "i ndecent" is taken in its true literary meaning.33

PRESENT LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE
Where did the Pre-Information Technology Act Laws Fail?

In India , cyber victimisation of women through foke avatars (which may
also include victimisation through trolling and bullying), which essentially
portray the victim with offensive sexual innuendo, is very often seen from the
perspective of the perpetrator's mens rea. In victimisation of women in the
cyber space through creation of fake avatars, two main types of mens rea can
be noted; (i) intentionally damaging the reputation of the woman through
creation of such foke avatars, and (ii) making profit from the foke avatars. In
the first case, the existing laws such as section 509 of the Indian Penal Code"
cou ld have ptovided a better solace to the victim as it categorically addresses
some of the main component issues such as (a) intention to insult the modesty
of the victim, (b) exhibition of an object to intentionally insult the modesty
of woman, (c) putting out vulgar and offensive comments in order to insult
the modesty of the woman, etc. This section also specifically mentions that
intention of the offender to actually harm the modesty or insult the woman

33

According to Oxford Dictionary. [he (crm 'indecent', when used as an adjective, may mean
"not conforming with generally accepted standards of behaviour, especially in relation to
sexual matte rs."

34

I NDIAN P ENAL CODE, 1860, S. s. 509 statcs [hat Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of
any woman , uners any word, makes any sound o r gesture, or exhibits any object, inrencling
mat such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen. by
such woman, o r intrudes upon the privacy of such woman, shall be punished with simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend lO one year, or with fine, or with both.
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must be taken into consideration. It also highlights the point that wh ile making
the object viewable or while making words viewable/audible, the perpetrator
must have this intention to actually make it viewable or audible. It is because
of these very reasons, this provision was extensively applied in the case of Ritu
Kohli," which is often described as India's first reported case on harassment of
an adult woman on the internet. But, the drawback from which this provision
suffers is that it does not specifically mention the medium of the harassment.
Also, it does not specifically touch on the offensive sexual innuendo factor.
The provision fails here when the foke avatars are essentially created to portray
the woman in an indecent fashion and as a sexual objen, which carries a
worse connotation than simple "insult to the modesty. " I\'onetheless, in the
Indian socio-legal understanding of modesty, women have almost always been
understood in the light of feminine decency and sexual reputation. 3G But, the
concept of offensive sex ual innuendo in victimisation through foke avatars
in cyberspace may have a far deeper impact than the concept of modesty as
understood in section 509 of the Indian Penal Code. Thi, is because it may
indicate offensive physical exhibition of the victim through cyber space and may
actually hamper the victim woman's right to equality and to live with dignity.
While the reported cases (such as the above four case studies) and a few other
studies in India" would show that this sexual innuendo tlcror, especially in

35

Kohli was constantly harassed by the perpetrator who was misusing her cyber identity to
chat with others in a panicular SNWS . He Roated obscene informati on abo ut her and
gave away her personal informacion like phone number. etc. For further info rmation see:

P. Duggal, India, First Cyba Stalking Cas" Some Cyba Law Pmpwivrs available at http: //
cyberlaws.net/cyberindial2CYBER27.htm.
36

This is apr.arem from the observations of the court in Rupan Dea l Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal
Singh Gil , 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059 , where the co urt observed that:
... The w 0 r d
'modesty' has not been defined in {he Indian Penal Code. From the dictionary meaning
of 'modesty' and the inrerpretation given to that word by the Supreme Court in Major

37

Singh case, it appears that the ultimate test for ascertaining whether modesty has been
ourraged is the action of the offender such as could be perceived 3.5 one, which is capable
of shocking the sense of decency of a woman. When the above test i!> applied in the present
case, keeping in view the wtal fact of the situat ion , it must be held that the alleged act
of the respondent in slapping the appellant on her posterior amounted to "outraging of
her modesty,n for it was not only an affront to the normal sense of fem inine decency but
also an affront to me dignity of the lady - "Sexual overtones" or not, notwithstanding.
For example. see, Sharmila Joshi. Untangling th~ wtb: th~ Intern~t and Violmu Against
Womm, in 9 DEGREES OP JUSTICEII4- 14 9 (ed. Bishakha Dult. Zubaan)
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cases of cyber victimisation of women, can be dealt with by other existing laws,
such as section 292 IPC and sections 67, 67A of the Information Technology
Act, my argument is that none of the above laws are fully qualified to address
the online victimisation thtough foke avatars. A minute examination of the
opening clause of section 292 of the Indian Penal Code would show that this
basically defines obscene books, pamphlets, paper, writing, drawing, painting,
representation , figure or any other object. The definition explains the meaning
of obscenity as 'lascivious' or 'appeals to the prurient interest' or if its effect or
(where it comprises two or more distinct items) the effect of anyone of its items
is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are
likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter
contained or embodied in it." This provision has been criticized by Indian
feminists as a half baked law which is extremely influenced by the patriarchal
outlook." They also pointed OUt that this definition overlooked the concept
of "sexually explicit representation ofwomen. " 3' During the 1970s and early 80s,
when the western world was being influenced by the second wave feminism,
which debated over issues like sexuality, workplace, family, reproduction,
etc.,'o Indian feminist movements pressurised the parliament to approach
the issue of sexually explicit representation of women from a perspective
different from obscenity. The result was creation of Indecent Representation
of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986, which with its ten Sections was made
essentially to "prohibit indecent representation of women through advertisements
or in publicatiom, writings, paintings, jigures or in any other manner and for
matters connected therewith or incidental thereto."41 The Act defined indecent
representation as "the depiction in any manner ofthe jigure ofa woman; her form
or body or any part thereof in such way as to have the effoct of being indecent, or
derogatory to, or denigrating women, or is likely to deprave, corrupt or injure the
38

Sec,

GEETANJALI GANGOLl, INDIAN FEMINISMS:

LAw

PATRIARCHIES AND VIOLENCE IN

I NOlA 70(2007).

39
40

Ibid
Sec. Christina Hughes, 5rcond WaUl Ftminism (date unknown) http: //www2.warwi ck.
ac. ukl fae! soc!soci 01 0 gyl staff! academ icstaffl io nesc! iQ nesc ind exi t cae h ing/birt hIsecond
wave feminism. pdf

41

This is the objective of the Indecent Representation of Women (Prevention) Act,1986

199

Vol. II

2013

National Law Schoo/Journal

public momlity or momls."42 This definition further attracted criticism from
the feminists as it embraced the concept of morality mOle and 0verlooked

derogarory (which may not be completely sexually explicit) messages targeted at
women .'3 The two core sections, namely section 3 and 4, of this Act prohibited
advertisements containing indecent representation of women (section 3) and
publication or sending by post of books, pamphlets etc., co ntaining indecent
representation of women (section 4).
As has been noted by feminist researchers 111 India," the In d ian legal
understanding regarding obsceniry and pornography is still blu rred. The
concepts of obscenity and pornography overlap with each other and the
shadow of obscenity law still shrouds the indecency law. When it comes ro
cyber victimisation through foke avatars, the problem becomes even deeper.
It needs to be temembered that this is the age of third wave femini sm which
indicates women's access not on ly right to equality, freedom and sexuality, but
also to expressing and embracing sexual desires," which obviously influences
the modern dress sense of women. Even though India has a history of orthodox
dress sense fot women which is still very much followed by majori ty of urban
and rural India ns, a section of Indian women have become more liberal in
unisex dress codes, photographing themselves with men (who mayor may
not be in a relationship with the woman in question) in intimate postures and
publishing these pictures in their social media profiles. This definitely leaves a
'generation gap' in understanding what could be a woman's right ro dress and
exhibit herself as per her own choice within the meaning of'freedom ofl ife and
liberry' as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and what co uld be
wrongful virtual stripping off and again re-dressing a victim with a false and
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derogatory identity. Section 292 of the Indian Penal Code and the definition
in section 2 of the Indecent Representation of Women (prohibition) Act, along
with section 4 of the Indecent Representation of Women (prohibition) Act,
were now being understood as outdated as the scope of these laws was now
loosing grip in the era of liberal dressing and photo sharing in the internet,
and came the Information Technology Act, 2000, which further addressed a
mixed bag of obscenity and pornography on the internet. The provision which
was included in the Information Technology Act, 2000, as the only protection
for men, women and children from obscenity and obscene activities on the
internet, soon called for more reforms as society was witnessing various patterns
of offences targeted at images and characters of both adults and children which
were not typically "obscene" as traditionally understood.

CHALLENGING ROLES OF SECTIONS 67, 67A AND 66A OF THE
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT
A clear reading of sections 67 and 67A of the Information Technology Act,
2000 (amended in 2008), would say that both these provisions target 'whoever'
publishes, transmits or causes to be published in the electtonic form any material
which (a) is (i) lascivious or (ii)appeals to the prurient interest or (iii) ifits effect
is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to
all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied
in it (section 67 of the Information Technology Act); or (b) which contains (i)
sexually explicit act or (ii)conduct. The wordings of this section would prove to
be extremely broad to include even the original profile creators if he/she him/
herself creates /publishes !transmits pictures showing too much skin or conduct,
which have been termed as 'sexually explicit' or 'obscene' by orthodox societies
where it is being viewed. It is for this very reason that in reality many women
victims are blamed by officials for dressing up in a 'too sexy' fashion which
would have prompted the perpetrator to commit the offence with the same
image.'6 This becomes a severe problem when the foke avatar is created by the
perpetrator with the images/pictures that he may have with him which would
46
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have been given to him with the consent of the victim, or which were taken
without the consent of the victim. However, when the piCI ure is stolen from
the victim's computer resources, including from her social media profiles, and
remodelled to create the fake avatar, these laws could be used with the help of
either section 65 of the IT Act which speaks about tampering with computer
source document or section 66 of the IT Act which speaks about computer
related offences from the perspective of criminal liabilities, or section 43 of the
Information Technology Act, which speaks about computt!r related offences
(i ncluding unauthorised access, etc.) from the perspective of civil liabilities,
along with relevant provisions from the Indian Penal Code, depending upon
the mens rea of the perpetrator. But again, neither of these two sections can
fully satisfY as prohibitory provisions against fake avatars. The reasons for this
observation can be explained below:
a.

This is especially so when the fake avatar falls neither in the category of
the one which section 67 addresses, nor in the one which section 67A
addresses, and it is made to mislead the viewer about the original identity
of the real victim. Such apparently "innocent fake avatars" can be seen
in the social media where the victim is represented as the "wife" of the
perpetrator, or in the matrimonial websites where the victim is portrayed
as one ready for the marriage market. Essentially such kinds of profiles
are created to harass the victim and damage the reputation of the victim .
Often the victim starts getting numerous harassing phone calls or her
family may be flooded with unnecessary and harassing questions. Even
though sections 66C and D of the Information Technology Act address
the issues of identity thefi: and cheating by impersonation , neither may
fully satisfY the question, as these avatars are not made for illegal gain,
but to harass the victim.

b.

Terming a fake avatar as obscene or sexually explicit material depends
hugely upon the website where it is created. For instance, if the fake avatar
is created in popular social media like Facebook or Twitter, on the basis
of the nature of the images and the language accompanying it, the avatar
is termed as 'impersonated profile' or profile containing 'sexually explicit
material' or 'obscene profile.' But, as explained above, given the present
context of the liberal dressing code of men and women, applying either of
sections 67 or 67A may become a double-edged weapon which may even
target the victim if the profile images are taken from the original pro file
where the victim had actually posted pictures which the general orthodox
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society would call 'sexually explicit' or 'obscene.' But, if the fake avatar
is made on any adult website, it may be immediately termed as sexually
explicit o r obscene because these websites are used for sexual erotica, and
it is naturally expected that the fake avatar (whether innocent or not) is
being viewed either as a sexually explicit material or as one which would
fulfill the conditions of obsceni ty.
Ironically, when a woman is represented through fake avatars which
contain pictures and descriptions, it depends upon the viewer to accept
it either as a sexually explicit material or as obscene material. But, when
the fake avatar is created on ly with offensive verbal description of the
victim, the police tend to apply section 66A primarily, along w ith either
of sections 67 or 67A of the Information Technology Act, depending upon
the photo images, if any. Ir needs ro be understood that a fake avatar can
be created with verbal description with racy and offensive words , also. In
cases of bullying and trolling where the victim is attacked with abusive
words, instant fake avatars can be formed which may describe the victim in
extremely vulgar, offensive and misleading words . Singer Chinmayi's case
can be a classic example of it. In her blog http://www.chinmayisripada.
com!47, the singer had detailed the abuses she had been facing through
tweets. The lin ks provided herein would show that the offensive attacks
erupted when she questioned one Mahesh Murthy about his article in The
Hindusta n Times where she was shown as one of the frequent bloggers.4'
In this list, Murthy also mentioned one 'Rajan Radhamanalan' who was
placed just after C hinmayi as a frequent blogger.4' When C hinmayi asked
Murthy his reasons for describing her as" less known for her playback singing

and more for her meticuwusly updated online diary ofevery single thought shes
ever had" oand listing Rajan instead offamous Tamil writers and poets like
Vairamuthu , Murthy reportedly defended his writeup and findings as his
"own personal opinion"; he then reportedly said, "I am not journalist from

paid media owned by you (Parthiv) or Chinmayi to do your bidding about
@rajanleaks or other issues."51 The singer took this statement as extremely
insulting. Following this, she was described as "as ingapattalchinmayi"
47
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by Rajan, and there were flows of tweets suppornng Chinmayi and
tweets defending Rajan's right to speechY Chinmayi's blog also stated
that when she chose the blocking options provided by Twitter to stop
harassing messages at the first instance for the abusive tweets which
were written in Tamil, she was called as "Chinmayi is against Tami/ians
on Twitter. " 53 In her blog, she further stated that there was a standard
response for her supporters against the name calling asking them whether
Chinmayi was their girlfriend. 54 She also stated that one Manthiramoorthy
alias @thalapathy_8787 expressed in his blog that he would "marry a
better figure" than her. 55 The issue is under investigation presently;
whether the accused are really at fault would be proved only after the
investigation by the police and procedural trials and arguments in the
court; the incident may make a good example of how a woman can be
offensively represented. Chinmayi had reportedly provided the police with
the 'obscene posts' which were made against her which were posted in the
social media related to this issue, and that would have made the provisions of
section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (amended in 2008),
rightly fix in the case. But a minute examination of the words used in
the social media posts by the harassers would show how she was
represented falsely and derogatorily as a female singer who has deviated from
her job; who is against a race, a regional language and a caste. Finally, the
attack centred around the singer's prospects as a good girl in the marriage
market and her modesty.
c.

The question of breaching privacy of the woman is inherent in the
victimisation when fake avatars are created. The concept of privacy in
cases of fake avatars is not limited to omine privacy only; this essentially
includes data privacy also. Whether the fake avatar is created with the
images or not, it may pull out the private information of the victims in
extremely camouflaged ways. This may include exposing the victim to an
audience before whom, and in a fashion in which, &he never wished or
authorized anyone to expose her. Neither sections 67 nor 67A fo cuses on
this aspect. The investigating officers also hardly look at this issue unless
there are traditional methods of privacy breaching, like hacking, revealing
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the victim's personal and professional information, ere. In practice, when
fake avatars are created with such prominent privacy breaches, the IT Act
provides solution through either section 72 (which prescribes punishment
for breach of confidentiality and privacy) of the Information Technology
Act or sections 43 (which speaks about penalty and compensation for
damages to computer, computer systems, etc.), 65 (which prescribes
punishment for tampering with computer source documents), 66
(which prescribes punishment for computer related offences) and 66A
(which prescribes punishment for sending offensive messages through
communication services, etc.).

SCOPE OF INDECENT REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN
(PROHIBITION) ACT IN THIS ISSUE
As has been stated above, Indecent Representation of Women (Prevention) Act
was created to address representation of women which may not fall under the
purview of 'obscen ity.' The law was created to prohIbit indecent representation

through publication which can be communicated to any individual or general public
through two main channels: (i) advertisements and (ii) physically sending any
book, pamphlets, paper, slide, film, writing, drawing, painting, photograph,
representation or figure which contains indecent representation of women.
The term 'indecent representation of women' was defined as "depiction in any

manner ofthe figure ofa woman; her form or body or any part thereofin such way
as to have the effict ofbeing indecent, or derogatory to, or denigrating women, or is
likely to deprave, corrupt or injure the public morality or morals. " A closer analysis
would show that the definition highlights three aspects;
1.

Portrayal of the woman's body or any part of her body in an indecent way;
this also includes two more terms - 'figure' of a woman and 'form';

2.

The portrayal must be indecent, or derogatory or denigrating women;

3.

It must be of such nature as to deprave, corrupt or injure public morality.

These three primaty ingredients to build up the indecent representation ofwomen
have been often noticed by activists and the courts in numerous TV commercials
and cinemas in India. But, this has been sparingly used by the police in cases of
cyber victimisation of women, especially through foke avatars, adult bullying and
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trolling. There are two main reasons for this, which are as follows:
a.

As (he term obscenity in the Indian Penal Code is still shadowed by the
concept of morality and depravation of the mind, in this law, the term
'indecent representation' co uld not become free from the concept of
morality. The law deviates fro m section 292 Indian Penal Code on the
point that while section 292 can be used for obscenity and is a gender
neutral provision , the Indecent Representation of Women (Proh ibition)
Act is made ro protect the interests of women only. and it may cover
obscenity if the defi nition of the term indecent representation is taken in
its literal meaning, as this also aims to prevent the effect of the portrayal
which finally depraves or co rrupts the minds of the people.

b.

Much of the law's philosophy is re-established in sections 67 and 67A
of the Information Technology Act, even though the language of these
twO provisions does not make them gender specific like the Indecent
Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act. As this law does not cover
electronic media in the term 'publication' , it is overshadowed by both
sections 292, Ind ian Penal Code, and the Information Technology
Act through sections 67 and 67A. But, irrespective of this lacuna, the
Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act has been used in
some exceptional cases of cyber victimisation . For inslance, in the fourth
case study above, section 6 of the Indecent Represe tation of Women
(Prohibi tion) Act was used along with other relevaOl sections from the
Indian Penal Code and Info rmation Technology Act. N ticeably, the police
had booked the offender not only fo r physical assault including rape,
but also for circulating the rape scenes through digi tal technology; this
presumably gave enough ground to apply the provisions of the Indecent
Representation of Women (Prohib ition) Act as it included portrayal of
woman in an indecent manner.

The proposed amendment to the Indecent Representation of Wo men
(Prohibition) Act aims ro expand the scope of the law by incl uding publishing
through digital media, also. The question which arises here is could this
proposal prove more beneficial for women than section 67Aof the Info rmatio n
Technology Act? I argue that it may. My grounds for defence are as follows:

OBSCENITY VERSUS INDECENCY
W h ile the Ind ian legal understanding of the concept of obscenity and
pornography have almost always overlapped with each other due to colonial
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regularions, especially section 292 of the Indian Penal Code, the term 'indecency'
is relatively new to cap the concept of portrayal of materials which does nor
actually fall in the typical meaning of obscenity, but falls in the spectrum of
other sexual materials which may be immoral. In Ajay Goswami's case, the
Supreme Court showed extraordinary maturity in handling the concepts of
obscenity. The court observed that nudity is not obscenity;'6 at the same time,
society has changed so as to not consider material as obscene which used to be
considered as obscene earlier. 57 The court also observed that there is content
other than obscenity, which may not be of the standard which can be exposed
to children. The court didn't define pornogtaphy, nor explain the meaning
of sexually explicit content; but from the explanation for understanding the
meaning of obscenity, it becomes clear that not all content which has some
sexual Aavour can be called obscene. The definition of indecent representation
of women to a certain extent has tried to fill up this gap in the two concepts
of what is obscene and what may not fall in the purview of obscenity with a
specific indication that the content must be targeted rowards women . Also,
a clear reading of section 4, along with the definition as provided in section
2 of the IRPWA, would show that the term indecent representation must be
applied to the mens rea of the perpetraror. When the perpetrator intentionally
portrays a woman in a fashion to lower her reputation to those who can view
the portrayal and in reality consider the victim as one who has no moral value,
the object of the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act can be
fulfilled. Such portrayal need not be obscene in the fullest meaning of section
292 of the Indian Penal Code. But, it can be a portrayal which intentionally
denigrates the victim . It can be a nude or semi-nude picture which is circulated
with intention that the victim would be believed to be one who wishes ro
solicit sex.
The Act can also have excellent impact on the issues where the images of the
victim or her personal information are used by the perpetrator for malicious
advertisements in the World Wide Web. There are hardly any reported
56
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cases 1n India which discussed about cyber victimisatioll through indecent
advertisements with the help of degrading portrayal of women, which may have
been made by the fake avatars and personal information of women. However,
there are US examples ofCraigslist advertisements of women which had caused
miserable victimisation, including physical assault and rape." The Indecent
Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act addresses indecent representation
of women through advertisements in section 4. The term advertisement
is defined as "any notice, circular, label, wrapper or other document and also
includes any visible representation made by means of any light, sound, smoke or
gas. " The term is mostly read in the light of profit-making and probabi lities
of exposing children to such materials," even though in this definition, there
is no specific mention of commercial advertisements. H owever, in practice, it
can be seen that in India the perpetrators prefer to circulate the victimising
profile or information through multimedia messaging services, or with the
help offree platforms such as Facebook, and may share the webpage, web link
or the victimising website through the share options of search engines.6<> Even
though section 67 and 67A of the Information Technology Act are equipped
ro deal with such circulations, if the scope of the definition of advertisement,
as well as section 4 of the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition)
Acr, is extended to digital technology, victimisation of women in the fashion
of Craigslist victimisation can very well be prevented.

BEYOND VISUAL IMAGES
Further, the definition of the term 'indecent representation of women' can be
stretched beyond visual images which can be called obscene or sexually explicit.
Noticeably, section 67 of the IT Act punishes for publication of material which is
obscene, and 67A of the IT Act punishes for publishing material which contains
sexually explicit act or conduct. As the case srud ies suggest, both these sections
58
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are in reality heavily used for visual images. Section 67 however, is sparingly
used for verbal communications which are" lascivious," "appeals to the prurient
interest," or "its effict is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt the people" who
read, see or hear it. Indeed , this section can be used against defamatory words of
such nature, but it may not address severe adult bullying or trolling against the
woman victim where the words do not satisfY the literal meaning of'lascivious'
or do not actually appeal to the prurient interest, but the words carry verbal
representation of the woman in the degrading or filthiest language to portray
the woman in a fashion which she is nOt in her real life. For instance, the words
like "asingapataal" (which may mean ugly), as has been used in Chinmayi's case
may not fall under the purview of section 67 of the Information technology
act, but as it degrades the victim, it may come under the purview of section
3 of the IRWPA. In other words, it can be construed more broadly than the
term 'sexually explicit material,' which is neither defined properly in any law,
nor explained through judicial understandings.

DRAWBACKS
Interestingly, neither this law, nor sections 67 or 67A of the Information
Technology Act may stand as a safeguard to those women who contribute self
images which can be semi-nude or which shows too much skin. It needs to be
remembered that this is the age of third wave feminism where many women
have defined their own dressing statements6 '. Bra burning, slut walks6', etc.,
are some of the prominent examples of this movement through which women
have established their demand to be viewed as independent human beings who
would not bow down to social dressing rules and morality made by patriarchal
societies. Social media, like Facebook, being a global media, this thinking may
have also touched a large number of Indian educated youth. A look at the
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profile pictures of Indian women or thei r photo sharing albums may show
that many female universiry students and working young adults residing in
metropolitan cities do share picrures in revealing dresses, which could have
been termed 'indecent' in rhe background ofIndian orthodox social mind set
two or rhree decades ago. The drawback from which all these sections suffer
lies in rhe language which indicates "no person shall publish"{section 3 of the
Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act},"no person shall produce
or cause to be produced. .. " (section 4 of the Indecent Representation of Women
(Prohibition) Act) , and "whoever publishes or transmits... " [the starting words for
both sections 67 and 67A of rhe Information Technology Act.] This impacts
the right ro freedom of speech and expression as has been guaranteed under
Article 19(1 )(a) of the Constitution of India, which guarantees all citizens
shall have the right ro freedom of speech and expression. At the same time,
the target-section of all these provisions, i.e., 'whoever,' also brings back these
provisions within the purview of the 'reasonable restrictions' on the grounds of
'decency' or 'moraliry,' as has been stated in Article 19(2) ot' the Constitution.
This broad 'target section' of these laws re-established rhe fact that in India
rhe question of moraliry and decency is still regulated from the perspective of
patriarchal social rules. These provisions looked at the question of moraliry
from rhe receiver's end. But, the question of mens rea from the sender's end had
remained completely subdued in the language of these provisions. This can be
hugely misused by self-claimed moral policing groups who may be backed by
conservative religious and political bodies. Even though the Supreme Court in
Ajay Goswami's case established rhe fact rhat in a majoriry of the cases when
the dury falls on the judges ro decide the natUre of rhe content, the responsible
readers principles must be followed by rhe judges, but, it needs ro be remembered
at not many women prefer ro take their cases ro the level of the high court or
even the supreme court when they are victimised in cyber space. A majoriry of
the cases of rypical cyber victimisation of women rhrough foke avatars finish
their life span in the police stations. The trial courts are referred ro only when
the victim feels co urageous enough ro cooperate with the police. Wirh in this
limited 'room' for experimenting with rhe laws and the effects of them on the

210

Examining the Scope of Illdecellt Representation of WOlllell (Frevell tion) Act, 1986, in
the Light ofCyber Victilllisation of Women in Illdin

acrual misdeed, hardly any investigating officer or trial judges can be expected
to review the postings of the picrures or the accompanying language beyond
the ambir of sections 67, 67A of the Information Technology Act or section
292 of the Indian Penal Code.
Further, the proposed broadened scope of the Indecent Representation of
Women (Prohibition) Act increases the punishment of imprisonment term
from two years to a maximum of three years and monetary penalry from the
level of Rs. two thousand (which was termed as 'maximum' in the original
Section 6 of the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act) to the
level between Rs. Fifty Thousand to One Lakh in the case of first conviction.
In case of a second conviction, the imprisonment term has been proposed ro be
not less than twO years, which may be extended to seven years. The monetary
fine in case of second conviction is proposed to have been raised from the level
of between Rs. Ten Thousand to Rs. One Lakh to the level of between Rs. One
Lakh to Rs. Five Lakh. As has been stated above, this proposed increase in
the punitive sentences would bring the law at par with sections 67 and 67A
of the Information Technology Act, 2000(2008) which can be a cognizable
and bailable ofFence 6 ' A clear reading of the sentences that are prescribed in
both the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act as well as in
the Information Technology Act would show that theoretically the penology
that is adopted in these laws largely follow preventive theory, which aims to
make potential criminals aware of the outcome of the punishment 64 ]n practice,
however, in cases of victimisation of women through fake avatars (including
avatars made with visual images or thtough verbal descriptions, as happens
in bullying and trolling), the criminal justice admi nistration, including the
police and the judiciary, most often leave the offender on bail after charging a
fine or confiscating the hardware devices. This provides a huge chance for the
offender to come back with a new identity and new devices to take revenge on
the victim. This is understandable from the testimony of many victims who
63
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prefer to remove the offensive contents with the help ofhackers. 65 fu has been
noted in my proposed theory" irrational coping theory of victimisatioll, "66 such
irrational coping mechanism of the victims may further escalate the problem.
Also, the punishment prescribed in the proposed the Indecent Representation
ofWome" (Prohibition) Act amendment leaves a blank regarding the welfare of
the victim in a similar fashion as has been done in the Information Technology
Act. The question "what would a victim really want?" has no answer in either
the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, or the Information
Technology Act. The reason lies mainly in the fact that in the Indian criminal
justice system, victims are treated like witnesses,"' and the trend is followed in
cases of online victimisation of women through fake avatars as well. Mostly,
when the victim brings the case to the police, on the oral rep esentation of the
victim, the police removes the content either by tracking down and forc ing the
perpetrator to remove it himself or by contacting the service provider directly68
While providing effective measures rowards making crimina! justice system
more therapeutic, suggested that a direct appeal by the victim ro the offender
(both of whom may not be familiar with the legal procedures and laws) may
prove effective in making the offender accept his responsibilities.6' In the first
65

In my capacity as a cyber crime victim counsellor, I have noted that majority o f the victims
prefer (his mode of prevencing {he harassment as they would have been threatened or
given an impression that police and legal machinery cannot prevent the perpet rator from
taking severe revenge o nce the misdeed is complained about.
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The posmiatcs of the theory we re presented by me aJo~n,F with Dr. K. Jaishankar in our
presemation tided "eyba Crime and Victim turned 0llenders: An analysis of impact of
victimization and coping muhanisms of womm victims at the Stockholm Criminology
Symposium, organised by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brottsfore
by gganderadet - Bra), held during June 11-13, 2012 at Stockholm Sweden.
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This was observed by Dr. K. Jaishankar at the uOpening Discussion: Focusing on viC[ims of
crime - Comparing crime panerns and improving practice. Research ers' advice to policy"
(11 th June 20 12, along with Victor jammers, Policy Director, Victim Support Netherlands,
Beatrice Ask , Swedish Minister for Justice, Paula Teixcria da Cruz, th~ Portugese Minister
for justice. Professor jan van Dijk. the Netherlands. Professor VesnaNicolic~ Ristanovic,
Serbia. and Professor Sandra Walk1ate. UK) at the Stockholm Criminology Symposium.
held during June 11-13, 2012 at Stockholm , Sweden. The author was an invi ted speaker
in this symposium.( see http://www.bra.sc/bra/nytt.fran~bra/arkiv/ovriga~nyhete rI20 1206-0 5-the-stockholm-criminology-symposi um- 2012 .htm!)
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This is from my personal experiences as a cyber victim counsellor.
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case, i.e.. in victim-offender mediation, in reality the victim may get a chance to
make the offender accept the responsibility as Winick had suggested. But, the
fear of counter threatening of the victim by the perpetrator in future due to the
coercion of police may pose a big barrier for the victim to properly participate in
the victim-offender mediation process. The Information Technology Act neither
explicitly prescribes compensation, nor any other remedial measure to ensure
therapeutic approach to the victim; the proposed amendments to the Indecent
Representation ofWomen (Prohibition) Act have maintained the same approach.
But. it needs to be remembered that cases of cyber victimisation of women.
especially through offences like creation of fake avatars to describe the victim
indecently. may leave a deep impact on the victim. Not only the derogatory, false
and indecent avatar remains 'alive' for a long time creating huge embarrassment
for the victim, it may also affevr her professional as well as personal reputation as
a person with clean moral values. This makes the victim extremely traumatized
and may actually hamper her professional life. The effect of the alive and Aoating
flke avatar or the news report publishing the victimisation may be extremely

traumatizing. The victim may lose her job. her family members may be ridiculed
and her children may be targeted in schoo!. Added to the mental trauma, the
financial losses may prove fatal for the victim as well as her family. The law fails
here as the aim of the legislation fails ro recognize the need of the victim. With
this failure, the provision becomes anti therapeutic?O
Ironically, if the victimisation of women through derogatory. indecent flke
avatars in cyber space is seen from the perspective of defamation which lowers
her morale or causes substantial injury to her reputation , the victim may
claim for compensation. The law of defamation in India has been encrypted
in section 499 of the Indian Penal Code which states that "whoever by words.
either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs

by visible representations. makes

JURISPRUDENCE AND VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

3-14,9(2011).
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See Wexler O.S. (2012), New wine in new bottle: the need to sketch a chcrapcmic
jurisprudence code of proposed criminal process and practices. (May 1.2012). Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and Problem-Solving Justice. Jane Donoghue cd. , 2013. Forthcoming;
Ariwna Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 12-16. Available at SSRN: http: //ss rn.co m/
absrracr=2065454 or http://dx.doi.orgll 0.2139/ssrn.2065454
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or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing
or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation ofsuch
person is said, except in the cases hereinafier excepted, to defome that person."
Fourth explanation to section 499 Indian Penal Code fulther confi rms that

defamation occurs when the imputation directly or indirectly lowers the moral
or intellectual character of that person in the estimatio n of others. 71 The
section implies that defamation does create injury if the term is seen in the
light of section 44 of the Indian Penal Code, which states that "the word injury
denotes harm whatever, illegally caused to any person in body, mind, reputation
or property." Section 357(i )(b) of the Crim inal Procedure Code lays down the
court'S responsibiliry towards order to pay co mpensation by stating that "when
a court imposes a sentence offine or a sentence (including a sentence ofdeath) of
which fine forms a part, the court may, when passing judgment, order the whole
or any p art of the fine recovered to be applied. .. in the payment to any person of
compensation for any loss, or injury caused by the offince, when compensation
is in the opinion of the court recoverable by such person in a civil cour?2" The
philosophy of section 499 Indian Penal Code is reflected in Section 501 of the
Indian Penal Code which prescribes punishment for priming or engraving
matter known to be defamatory, section 509 of th e Indian Penal Code
which prescribes punishment for word, gesture or act intended to insult
the modesty of a woman, section 66A of the Information Techno logy Act
which prescribes punishment fo r sending offensive, annoying false, misleading
messages through digital communication systems, section 67 and 67A of the
Information Technology Act which prescribes punishment for publishing, etc.,

71

I NDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860, §499. Explanation 4,states: No imp utation is said to harm
a person's rcpuc3rion unless that impm3rion directly or ind irectly, in the est imatio n of
others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of that perso n. o r lowers the character of
that person in respect of his caste, or calling or lowers (he credit o f that perso n o r causes
it to be believed that the body o f that person is in a loathsom e sta te or in a state generall y

considered as disgraceful.
72

It becomes essential here

to

point out that 5.357 (1) (b) of toe C ri minal Procedure

Code is a Therapeutic Jurisprudence fri endly provision. This is especially because this
Provision not only directs the judge to frame up the expected behavior o f the offender
towards compensating the victim, it also shows simpl e ways to settle the issues through
civil mediarion.(for more information regarding therapeutic impact of the laws , sec supra
note 71
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of obscene and sexually explicit materials; and sections 3 and 4 of the Indecent
Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act. The fines prescribed in these
provisions can be used for compensation if the therapeutic approach of section
357(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code by way of payment of compensation
is stretched ro cover the victimisation of women through fake portrayal in the
cyber space holistically. But, it needs ro be remembered that the court cannot
suo motu award compensation to the victim, and the victim needs to claim her
rights under section 199(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code." either herself or
through her immediate family members, like her husband'· who is aggrieved
by the offence. But, in reality, neither the Indecent Representation of Women
(Prohibition) Act, which is specifically meant and proposed to be amended
to provide justice to women victims of indecent portrayals including in cyber
space, speaks of any such measures, nor are the victims made aware of any such
rehabilitative measures that are offered by the laws. The resultant effect is that
the proposed IRWPA like the IT Act may also become a one phase provision
which would be able to prevent misdeeds only and leave the victims perpetually
tagged as individuals who are potential targets for indecent representation
because of their gender.

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
The Indecent Representation of Women (Prevention) Act and the proposed
amendments to it can fill in the long-needed legal requirements for preventing
cyber victimisation of women in India. Bur, the provision and the proposed
amendments are not flawless. The proposed amendments basically highlight
two issues - extending the scope of the law to digital mechanism as a way to
victimise women and bringing in the penalties to be at par with the penalties as
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THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , 1973, §I99(I),states that: No court shall take
cognizance of an offence punishable under chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860)except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence; provided
that where such person is under the age of 18 years, or is an idiot, or a lunatic, or is from
sickness or infirmity unable to make a complaint, or is a woman who according to local
customs and manners ought not to be compelled to appear in public, some other person
may, with the leave of the Court, make a complaint on his or her behalf.
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prescribed in the Information Technology Act, especially u der sections 67 and
67A. It is defin itely a welcome move, as India may get a law focu sed solely on
the victimisation of women through indecent portrayal, bllt at the same time,
the concept of indecent representation of women must be freed from patriarchal
meanings of social value and moralities. At the same time, the language of
the law must be amended to properly indicate the offender's responsibility,
rather than using the term "whoever." This would make the law more victimfriendly. For long, the laws meant to prevent publication of victimising profiles
of women neglected the issue of victim welfare. The Indecent Representation
of Women (Prohibition) Act is no exception. It is undersundable tha t in the
orthodox Ind ian social value system, both the victim and the police officer who
is approached by the victim, or the trial judge in exceptional cases, may limit
the damage by way of immediate removal of the content and prescribing the
sentences for the offender that are enctypted in the relevant legal provisions.
Bur, it is vety much essential to look at the victim's welfare beyond mere removal
of the content. The Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act may,
through the Rules, prescribe measures for women victim's welfare which can be
made in the light oflegal provisions meant for defamation and compensation
for the same. This measure may prove fruitful towards removing the shadow
of a patriarchal social value system from the concept of gmder and harm to
the reputation of women.
Further, it needs to be remembered that merely by prescribing a jail term or
fine as punishment, cyber victimisation cannot be prevented The responsibility
of online service providers like Google, Facebook or Twitter, which are
actually hosted in the US, seems almost blind when it comes to the question
of monitoring the usage of subscribers through creating /lew identities and
using the social media or the web platforms for further l1arassment of the
victims." In India, the regulation for service providers is quite the same.
75

(codified at 47USC ,),which regulates ,he
liability of the service providers under clause (c) with the heading "Protection For 'Good
Samaritan' BlockinfAnd Scruning 0fOffinsiv~ Maurial' in sub clause (1) states that "no

THE COMMUNICATION DECENCY ACT, §2JO

provider or user 0 an ime ractive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information coneent provider." In sub
clause (2), it states that no provider or user of an interactive computer service shaH be
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Section 79(1) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (amended in 2008)
exem pts the liabili ty of the intermediary ''for any third party information,
data ar communicatian link made availoble ar hasted by him, "76 provided the
intermediary exercises due diligence." Given these legal boundaries, it needs
to

be remembered that in India presently there exists no stringent system of
held liable on account of (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith
to

I.
It.

III.

or availability of material that the provider or user considers

lO

(Q

restrict access

be obscene, lewd,

lascivious, filthy, excess ively violent, harassing, or mhc[,\\iise objectionable. whether or
not such materiaJ is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make
available to inform ation content providers or others the technical means to restrict access
to material described in paragraph (1). THE D IGITAL MILLENIUM COpy RIGHT ACT, §512,
fu rther provides for the "due diligence" of the service providers regardin g the immunity
for infringemem of materials which arc hosted in their website. The provision lays down
three basic conditions to avail the immunity, which are:
The provider mUSt not have the requisitc level of knowledge of the infringing activity.
If the provider has the right and abiliry to comrol the infringing activity, it must not
receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.
Upon receiving proper notificarion of claimed infrin gement, the provider mUSt
expeditiously take down or block access to the material.

76 THE INFORJ\tATiON TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000, §79(2), states that ISPs as intermediaries
will not be responsibl e when:
the function of the intermediary is limited to providing access to a commun ication system
over which information made available by third parties is transmined or temporarily
srored; or
(b) the interm ed iary does not
(i) iniciate the transmi ssio n ,
(ii) select the receiver of the transmission, or
(iii) seiect or modify the information con tained in the transmission.
(c) the intermediary observes due diligence while discharging his dUlies under this Act and
also observes such mher gu ideli nes as thc Central Government may prescribe in this
behalf.
(a)

§79(3) further states that ISP as an intermediary can be made liable, i.e., if
the imerm ediary has conspired or abetted or aided or induced, whether by threat s or
promise or otherwise, in the commission of the unlawful act;
(b) upon recciving actual knowledge , or on being notified by the appropriatc Government or
its agency, that any information, data or communication link res idin g in or connected [Q
a computer resource controlled by the imermediary is being used to commit the unlawful
act, the interm edia ry fa ils to expeditiously remove or disable access [Q (hat material on
that resource without vitiating the evidence in any manner.
THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (INTERMEDIARIES GUIDELINES) RULES, 2011,§3(2) (a),
(b), (d), (e), (f) and (g) further explains due diligence of the intermediaries by stating that
rhe intermediaries must provide proper Folicy guidelines staring what can be published
through the intermediaries, etc. For ful information, see the Information Technol ogy
(Inte rm ediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011.
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usage of uniform identification number for creating email account or getting
a mobile SIM card." This encourages the perpetraror ro come back with new
identities availing new/old service providers ro re-victimise me victims. In such
a case, deterrent steps, like banning the offender from contacting the victim
through digital com munication media or making the soc ial media aware by
serving a preventive and moniroring notice against the perpetraror user can
prove fruitful. The Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act as
well as the Information Technology Act must consider such preventive actions
ro prevent cases of cyber victimisation, especially victimisation of women.
Social media and adult sites are being misused for degrading portrayal of
women not only by men, but also by women, as can be seen from the 5'h case
study. Unless the intention to cause damage is incorporated in the provisions
meant for defi nition of the concept of the Indecent Representation of Women
(Prohibition) Act and also in the related provisions in Infor mation Technology
Act and the Indian Penal Code which are often roped in to support the
provisions in the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, and
the suggestions that this paper provides rowards preventi g the victimisation
are considered for the future amendments for laws meant to prevent cyber
victimisation of women through indecent, false derogarory foke avatars, the
victimisation of women in cyber space may become an unending example of
the failure ofl aw.

78

Even though Aadhar promises (0 provide a uniform identificatio n number for all Ind ian
citizens, the system has not yet cove red the whole of India. and or has it been used ti ll
now to avail imernct connectio n or mobile phone connection.
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